Water, Workship, And Wisdom: Indigenous Traditional Ecological Knowledge And The Human Right To Water by Larson, Rhett B.
WATER, WORSHIP, AND WISDOM: INDIGENOUS
TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER
Rhett B. Larson*
The relationship between religion and water, whether as a spiritual
symbol or ceremonial source, is virtually universal. This relationship is
often very strong in the religious practices and beliefs of indigenous
peoples, who typically have a strong spiritual connection to their
traditional lands and waters. This connection is often manifested in
"traditional ecological knowledge" (TEK), socially-beneficial
environmental management practices, and information transmitted by
cultural and often religious tradition.
As indigenous communities and the ecological integrity of indigenous
traditional waters are threatened, indigenous people may turn to claims
under international human rights as a means of protecting water resources
and securing water rights. The current approach to the international
human right to water is likely to prove inadequate for indigenous people to
achieve protection of water quality and an equitable apportionment of
water resources. A new approach to the human right to water, grounded in
religious rights and religiously-based TEK, could provide a stronger
protection for indigenous water rights and the water quality of traditional
indigenous waters. This Essay proposes such an approach, as well as a
framework for international courts to adjudicate indigenous religious
rights-based claims to water resources.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Water is used in ceremonies or as a symbol in nearly every religious
community. Despite this near universal connection between religion and
water, the religious use or protection of water is largely ignored in legal
scholarship. The spiritual character of water makes for an inconvenient co-
religionist with water demand economics and environmental protection
science, posing a miasma of legal complications. The legal challenges
associated with the relationship between water and worship are particularly
complex for indigenous communities. Unlike many mainstream religions,
indigenous communities often center religious worship on particular
[Vol. 19:1
geographic features, including rivers.' This unique relationship between
faith and geography blends complex questions on the scope and meaning of
the right to life, with similar questions relating to property rights, religious
rights, and sovereignty rights.
This essay evaluates how indigenous communities' religious rights, in
connection with indigenous traditional ecological knowledge, may support
indigenous community claims to water rights and protection of water
quality under international law. Section I places the religious rights-based
approach to the international human right to water for indigenous
communities within the broader discussion on the human right to water.
Section I also notes the advantages of a religious rights-based approach for
indigenous communities seeking access to, or protection of, water
resources. Section II addresses the implications of indigenous religious
rights-based claims to water in the context of religiously-based traditional
ecological knowledge related to water. Section III proposes how
indigenous communities can best pursue a religious rights-based approach
to water resource claims, and a potential framework for adjudicating
indigenous religious rights claims to water under international law.2
II. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER AND RELIGION
Indigenous communities suffer disproportionately from environmental
degradation and appropriation of their traditional lands and resources.3 For
example, the Huaroni are a small tribe living along the Napo and Curaray
Rivers in the rain forests of Ecuador who have suffered from pollution of
their traditional water sources from oil development.4 As part of an effort
to respond to this growing global crisis, of which the Huaroni are only one
example, the United Nations (U.N.) issued its Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (EP Declaration) in 2007. 5 Article 25 of the IP
Declaration provides that indigenous peoples "have the right to maintain
I. See generally GREGORY CAJETE, LOOK TO THE MOUNTAINS: AN ECOLOGY OF
INDIGENOUS EDUCATION (Kivaki Press 1994).
2. This essay summarizes the broader analysis originally published in the Arizona
Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, Volume 2, Issue 1 (2011); see generally Rhett Larson,
Holy Water and Human Rights: Indigenous Peoples' Religious-Rights Claims to Water
Resources, 2 ARIZ. J. OF ENV. L. & POL'Y 81 (2011).
3. See JULIAN BURGER, REPORT FROM THE FRONTIER: THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (1987); see also Robert K. Hitchcock, International Human Rights, the
Environment, and Indigenous Peoples, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (1994).
4. William A. Shutkin, International Human Rights Law and the Earth: The Protection
ofIndigenous Peoples and the Environment, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 479, 496-97 (1991).
5. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, 10, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/47/1 (Sept. 7, 2007) [hereinafter IP Declaration].
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and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally
owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, [and] waters 6
[emphasis added]. The U.N. thus draws a connection between spiritual
practice and rights to the use of water by indigenous peoples. This
connection suggests a potential novel approach to indigenous water rights
claims under international law.
Indigenous communities may face challenges in asserting a
religiously-based right to water through domestic law. With respect to
water, indigenous communities are often constrained by their relationship
7with national governments. This section evaluates the potential to pursue a
religiously-based right to water under international human rights law, and
how such an approach may prove more successful in securing or improving
water resources for indigenous communities than alternative theories under
international law.
A. The Right to Water Under United Nations Declarations
Ultimately, the potential for a religious rights-based argument to water
resources by indigenous peoples under international law may depend upon
the existence of an enforceable international human right to water. The
human right to water has been addressed expressly in several U.N.
documents, but those documents, like the IP Declaration, are not typically
legally binding.
The most recent non-binding iteration of the formulation of the
international human right to water was set forth by the U.N. General
Assembly on July 28, 2010.8 That resolution declared that the "right to safe
and clean drinking water ... [is] a human right that is essential for the full
enjoyment of life and all human rights."9  Despite the political and
diplomatic role this resolution plays in encouraging expanding access to
safe drinking water, this resolution does not establish a legally binding and
enforceable human right to water.' 0 Nor does this resolution answer the
questions at the heart of the human right to water debate: Must water be
provided for free or heavily subsidized, and if so, by whom and who covers
the cost? If free or heavily subsidized, what are the implications for
conservation? How much water, and what quality of water, is required?
6. Id. at art. 25.
7. William Blatt, Holy River and Magic Mountain: Public Lands Management and the
Rediscovery of the Sacred in Nature, 39 LAW & SOC. REV. 681, 682 (2005).
8. The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 108th plen. mtg.
at 4, U.N. Doc. A/64/PV.108 (July 28, 2010).
9. Id. at 17-18.
10. Id.
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Against whom is the right enforceable? Does such a right create rights in
nations vis c vis other nations, or in non-state actors vis 6 vis other nations
or their own nations?
U.N. human rights instruments generally do not mention water
expressly, and thus an international water right must be inferred.1 For
example, Article 25 of the U.N.'s Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(HR Declaration) provides the following: "Everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of
his family." 12 This right infers a right to access water, without which there
is no standard of living at all. 3 However, the HR Declaration is binding
only to the extent it has become part of "customary international law" and
guides interpretation of other U.N. documents.'
4
To the extent the HR Declaration is binding, it is likely binding only
for "liberty rights" (e.g., those natural rights with which governments will
not legally interfere without due process) and is not binding for "welfare
rights" (e.g., rights to goods or services which governments must secure or
extend). 5 Any water right inferred from the HR Declaration would likely
be considered a non-guaranteed "welfare right."'
16
The ultimate power of the HR Declaration, the IP Declaration, and the
recent General Assembly Resolution on the human right to water lie in their
political and diplomatic role and interpretive influence, not in their legal
effect. This power, though not negligible, still compels indigenous
communities to look elsewhere to ground claims to water quality or water
resources on guaranteed rights enforceable in international tribunals by
non-state actors.
B. The Right to Water Under United Nations Covenants
Unlike the U.N. declarations and resolutions described above, the
U.N.'s 1967 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CP Covenant) imposes
11. Stephen McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implications, 5
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 7 (1992).
12. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/Res/217/64
(1948) [hereinafter HR Declaration].
13. McCaffrey, supra note 11, at 7-8.
14. Id.; see also Eric Posner and Alan Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law:
Optimal Remedies, "Legalized Noncompliance, " and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REV. 243,
290-91 (2011).
15. Posner & Sykes, supra note 14. For an overview of human rights under U.N. treaties
and the distinction between negative and positive rights, see LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN
RIGHTS, 214-23 (2d ed. 2009).
16. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 214-23.
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an immediate obligation to ensure the rights it contains. 7 Article 6
provides that every person "has the inherent right to life."' 8 Life cannot be
sustained without adequate water; thus, the CP Covenant arguably requires
states to ensure access to adequate water to all people.' 9 However, many
commentators view this right to life as a "liberty right," which does not
impose an affirmative obligation on governments to provide adequate
water.2°
The U.N. adopted the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ESC Covenant) in 1967.21 Article 1 1 recognizes a right to an
"adequate standard of living," which implies a right to water (at least a
"liberty right").22 The ESC Covenant, however, requires only that states
"take steps ... to the maximum of [their] available resources, with a view
to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
[ESC Covenant]," and thus is practically non-binding on states.23
A right to water was recognized in 2002 under General Comment 15 to
the ESC Covenant.24 General Comment 15 infers the right to water from
other rights under the ESC Covenant, finding the right to water
"indispensable" to the realization of other human rights and recognizing the
right to water in other international legal instruments, including human
rights treaties and environmental declarations.25
Nevertheless, General Comment 15 alone likely does not support an
international legal claim to water. General Comment 15 does not constitute
a legally binding interpretation of the ESC Covenant.26 Even if Comment
17. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter CP Covenant]; see also McCaffrey, supra note 11,
at 9.
18. CP Covenant, supra note 17, at art. 6.
19. Id.
20. MeCaffrey, supra note 11, at 9.
21. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter ESC Covenant].
22. Id. at art. 11.
23. Id. at art. 2(1).
24. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15, U.N. Doe.
E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter General Comment 15].
25. Id.
26. Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 957, 972 (2004).
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15 enshrined a human right to water in the ESC Covenant, "it would be
largely of symbolic value.,
27
Additionally, the ESC Covenant is a weak foundation upon which to
base the human right to water, as compared to the CP Covenant. The CP
Covenant contains a stronger statement with respect to state obligations and
includes an adjudicative process.28 The CP Covenant also includes a
binding Optional Protocol, which provides a legal mechanism whereby
non-state actors, including indigenous communities, can bring claims
against their own nations for violations of human rights.29  The ESC
Covenant is ambiguous as to state obligations and lacks adjudicative
processes. Furthermore, unlike the CP Covenant, the ESC Covenant's
Optional Protocol remains non-binding, and thus there is no mechanism
whereby non-state actors can bring claims under the ESC Covenant. 30 The
absence of a binding Optional Protocol, the relatively weak obligation only
to "progressively realize" guaranteed rights, and its ambiguity and lack of
adjudicative processes and precedent combine to make the ESC Covenant
"normatively and jurisprudentially underdeveloped compared to the [CP
Covenant]. '
C. An Independent Human Right to Water
The human right to water could arise as an independent right if it
constitutes binding "customary international law." 32 There is an increasing
support for the existence of that independent right. For example, the Dublin
Statement (a non-binding U.N. document) declared that it is "vital to
recognize the basic right of all human beings to have access to clean water
and sanitation at an affordable price. 33 However, few countries recognize
27. STEPHEN MCCAFFREY, The Human Right to Water, in FRESH WATER AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 93-115, 108 (Edith Brown Weiss et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2005).
28. See CP Covenant, supra note 17, at art. 2, 1.
29. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
30. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 63/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008).
31. SARAH JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 163 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d
ed. 2004).
32. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS (Foundation Press 2001).
33. International Conference on Water & the Environment, Jan. 26-31, 1992, The Dublin
Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, princ. 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 15 I/PC/ 112 (Mar. 12,
1992) [hereinafter Dublin Statement].
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an independent right to water, and the right to water has likely not achieved
the status of "customary international law."34
Furthermore, the Dublin Statement, and even Comment 15, each
discuss water as a "good., 35 Comment 15 refers to water as a "public
good., 36 The Dublin Statement provides that water has "economic value in
all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good.,
37
As such, international law likely does not view privatization as a per se
violation of the human right to water.38  These documents arguably
undercut claims to a human right to water on any basis other than "liberty
rights" by characterizing water as an economic commodity and private
property.39  Indigenous communities are thus unlikely to ground a
successful claim to water resources on a "customary international law"
basis for a human right to water.
D. A Negative Rights Approach Over a Positive Rights Approach
Two recent domestic cases illustrate how a negative rights approach to
the human right to water, such as an approach made under the CP
Covenant, could prove more successful for indigenous peoples than a
positive rights approach.
A recent case, Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg from South Africa's
Constitutional Court, illustrates the potential pitfalls of a positive rights
approach to the human right to water.40
South Africa was the first country to explicitly provide a constitutional
right to "sufficient" water.41 South Africa's government interpreted this to
mean a guarantee of at least twenty-five liters of water per person each
day.42 Initially, the City of Johannesburg complied with this requirement
by supplying water based on a payment of a single, flat fee.43 However,
this soon proved economically unsustainable, particularly in Phiri, a poor
34. Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a Human
Right and the Duties and Obligations it Creates, 4 NW. J. INT'L. HUM. RTS. 331, 338 (2005).
35. General Comment 15, supra note 24.
36. Id.
37. Dublin Statement, supra note 33.
38. McCaffrey, supra note 27, at 106.
39. Hardberger, supra note 34, at 334.
40. Mazibuko & Others v. The City of Johannesburg & Others 2009 ZACC 28, CCT
39/09 (CC) at 16 (S. Aft'.).
41. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 at art. 27.
42. Mazibuko, supra note 40, at 11.
43. Id. at 15; see also South African Water Services Act of 1997, § 9 (S. Aft.).
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and predominantly black neighborhood in the Soweto area of the City.44
Phiri residents paid only one percent of the cost it took to provide the
neighborhood with water.45 In response to this problem, the City changed
its policy. 46 It provided twenty-five liters per person each day for free, and
then installed prepaid meters.47 If residents did not prepay for water, their
water services were cut off, even though regulations required notice and a
hearing prior to cessation of water services.48 While other parts of the City
continued to pay for water on credit, Phiri was one of the few areas where
the new "free basic water policy" was implemented. 49 Residents of Phiri
claimed the City's "free basic water policy" violated their constitutionally
guaranteed right to water.5
At the trial court level, the court held in favor of the Phiri residents,
claiming that twenty-five liters per person each day was insufficient and the
free amount should have been fifty liters per person each day.5' On appeal,
the appellate court held again for the Phiri residents, but reduced the
amount of free water to forty-two liters per person each day. On appeal,
the South African Constitutional Court, however, deferred to the City's
"free basic water policy" approach and reversed the lower court rulings.
5 3
Ultimately, the South African Constitutional Court concluded that the
positive right to water guaranteed by the South African Constitution could
not be imposed without consideration of available resources and cost
recovery of services provided.54 The practical considerations of funding a
sustainable water supply and distribution effectively precluded a successful
human rights claim to a certain quantity or quality of water.
On the other hand, a negative rights approach, based on the types of
rights guaranteed under the CP Covenant, could prove more straightforward
and thus more successful. An example of the success of such a "traditional
civil rights" approach to the human right to water (though at the national,
rather than international level) can be found in the Mosetihanyane case in
44. Mazibuko, supra note 40, at 10.
45. Id. at 146.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 26.
48. Id. at 28; see also South African Promotion of Administrative Justice Act of 2000
(S. Afr.).
49. Mazibuko, supra note 40, at 31.
50. Id. at 105.
51. Id. at 26.
52. Id. at 28.
53. Id. at 171.
54. Mazibuko, supra note 40, at 169.
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Botswana.55 Here, Kalahari Bushmen secured the right to access
traditionally-used wells for drinking water based on their constitutionally-
protected right to be free from degrading or inhumane treatment. 6 Even
though the national constitution of Botswana did not provide for an express
"welfare right" to water, the right to water was secured in connection with
express traditional civil rights embodied in the constitution and mirrored in
Article 7 of the CP Covenant, which guarantees freedom from "cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment.,
57
Reliance on a "liberty right," such as the right to be free from cruel or
degrading treatment grounds claims on well-adjudicated, clearly binding
rights that do not implicate issues of limited resources or cost recovery.58
By avoiding such issues through a negative rights approach, the Kalahari
Bushmen secured the access to water they desired.59 By confronting such
issues, the residents of Phiri failed to secure the access to water they
desired, despite an express guarantee of a positive right to water in the
South African Constitution.6° Such an approach is even less likely to secure
water in the international context, where no express guarantee of water
exists. Importantly, in the only two instances in which water is expressly
mentioned in binding international human rights instruments, it is
mentioned in connection with a negative right-the right to be free from
discrimination as a child or as a woman.61
E. The Human Right to Water and Religious Rights
Based on the above, to formulate the strongest argument under
international law supporting a human right to water, the claimant should
base its argument on rights contained in the CP Covenant. The argument
for a human right to water should not be framed as a "welfare right" under
the ESC Covenant, as these rights must only be implemented progressively
and in accordance with available resources and lack a mechanism for non-
state actors to bring a claim against their own nations. Instead, the human
55. See generally Matsipane Mosetlhanyane et al. v. Attorney General, Court of Appeals
of the Republic of Botswana, Civil Appeal No. CACLB-074-10 [hereinafter Mosetlhanyane];
High Court Civil Case No. MAHLB-000393-09.
56. Id.
57. CP Covenant, supra note 17, at art. 7.
58. See generally Mosetlhanyane, supra note 55.
59. Id. at 37.
60. Id. at 36.
61. Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1
March 1980, 1249 UNTS 13, Can TS 1982 No 31 [hereinafter CEDAW]; see also Convention on
the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, Can TS 1992 No 3 [hereinafter CRC].
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right to water should be framed as a "liberty right." Such rights under the
CP Covenant are immediately binding upon states and have clear
adjudicative processes available to non-state actors.
With a well-established adjudicative process available to non-state
actors, the right to freely exercise one's religion is a "liberty right" within
the CP Covenant and is immediately binding on states.62 Article 18 of the
CP Covenant provides that everyone "shall have the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion. '63 This right shall include "freedom to..
. either individually or in community with others... manifest his religion
or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.'6 4 The CP
Covenant provides that religious freedom may be limited only as
"prescribed by law and [as] necessary to protect public safety, order, health,
or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 65
Any governmental action relating to water which burdens an
individual or community's religious practice could constitute a violation of
Article 18 of the CP Covenant, which is binding on states and includes an
adjudicative process.66 Such governmental actions could include, among
other actions, discharge or abstraction permits decreasing stream flows, or
degrading water quality, dam construction, international water treaties with
unreasonable or inequitable apportionments, and the establishment of water
quality regulations insufficiently protective of water quality.67
When interpreted under the IP Declaration, religious rights under the
CP Covenant may provide a strong legal basis for indigenous communities
to assert a religious rights-based claim to water resources. The IP
Declaration implicitly connects the religious rights of the CP Covenant to
indigenous communities' rights to maintain and strengthen their "distinctive
spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied
and used lands, territories and water.,
68
62. Puja Kapai and Anne S.Y. Cheung, Hanging in the Balance: Freedom of Expression
and Religion, 15 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 48 (2009).
63. CP Covenant, supra note 17, at art. 18.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. IP Declaration, supra note 5, at art. 25.
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III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF INDIGENOUS RELIGIOUS RIGHTS-BASED CLAIMS
TO WATER RESOURCES
Beyond the potential legal strategic advantages noted above,
indigenous claims to water based on religion may carry positive and
negative implications for cultural and ecological conservation, sovereignty
and self-determination of indigenous communities, interpretation of
existing water law, and resolution of water conflicts.69
For example, the Pueblo of Isleta (Pueblo), a tribal nation located in
the Southwestern United States (U.S.), sought approval from the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for water quality standards
established by the tribe.70 The standards proposed by the Pueblo were more
stringent than typical EPA-approved water quality standards established by
the states, as the Pueblo sought protection for ceremonial uses of the
water. 71 The EPA approved these standards in an acknowledgement of the
tribe's right to self-determination and sovereignty over natural resources,
and the tribe's policy towards improvement of water quality and
72
environmental protection. Despite these benefits, upstream water users
complained that these stringent standards placed an undue burden on their
water uses.73 The upstream users, including municipalities, challenged the
EPA's approval of the Pueblo's standards because they assumed costs
associated with changes to their water uses and treatment of discharges into
the river to conform to standards.74 Upstream users claimed these standards
were unreasonable, in part because they were based on religious beliefs
they did not share; further, they considered these standards contrary to the
best available science on appropriate standards established through a cost-
benefit analysis.75
Religiously-based policies and practices toward natural resources can
thus be a double-edged sword for indigenous communities. On the one
hand, they may serve to preserve otherwise threatened traditional uses and
cultural practices, promote and protect self-determination and sovereignty,
and maintain and improve environmental quality and human health. On the
69. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The
Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 226
(1996).
70. Id. at 235; see also City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F.Supp. 733, 733 (D.N.M.
1993).
71. Tsosie, supra note 69, at 236; City ofAlbuquerque, 865 F.Supp. at 736, 740.
72. Tsosie, supra note 69, at 235.
73. Id. at 236.
74. Id.
75. Id.; City ofAlbuquerque, 865 F.Supp. at 740.
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other hand, such policies and practices may be viewed as unreasonable and
unfair by those who share the resources with the indigenous community or
compete for claims to a right over the resources.
A. Religious Rights to Water and Traditional Ecological Knowledge
The religiously-based approach toward resource protection and
environmental policy demonstrated in the case of the Pueblo of Isleta
codified traditional religious beliefs and practices related to the protection
of water resources.76 Religious rights-based claims to water provide a legal
bulwark to potentially beneficial indigenous resource management
methods. Indigenous communities may develop valuable TEK embodied
in religious ceremonies and teachings that promote sustainable water
management.77 TEK is a "body of knowledge, practice and belief, evolving
by adaptive processes and handed down through generations by cultural
transmission, about the relationship of living beings (including humans)
with one another and with their environment."
78
Failure to legally protect indigenous religious-based TEK could have
adverse ecological as well as cultural impacts, as there is an "inextricable
link" between cultural and biological diversity that gives rise to a
"converging extinction crises [sic]." 79  A religious-based claim to
indigenous water rights operates on both fronts of these crises. By
protecting and promoting environmentally-beneficial TEK through legal
means, law may mitigate threats posed to both survival of indigenous
cultures and to the environmental quality of traditional indigenous lands
and waters.8°
Additionally, religious-based claims to water rights reinforce the
legitimacy of indigenous, religious-based TEK. For example, in the Katun
River Basin in Siberia, the Altaians' religious beliefs prohibit the
subjugation of the natural world and thus the Altaians opposed construction
of a dam on the Katun River; the Katun River holds a particular religious
significance for the Altaians.81 Part of their strategy in successfully
76. Tsosie, supra note 69, at 236.
77. FIKRET BERKES, SACRED ECOLOGY: TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 8 (Taylor and Francis: Philadelphia 1999).
78. Id.
79. Luisa Maffi, Linguistic, Cultural, and Biological Diversity, 29 ANNUAL REV.
ANTHROPOL. 599, 602-11 (2005).
80. Id. at 611.
81. Kheryn Klubnikin, Cynthia Annett, Maria Cherkasova, Michail Shishin & Iina Fotieva,
The Sacred and the Scientific: Traditional Ecological Knowledge in Siberian River Conservation, 10
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1296, 1297-1300 (2000).
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opposing the dam was informing scientists of their religious-based TEK,
which included distinguishing fish species by physical characteristics and
their knowledge of the medicinal properties of plants that would have been
harmed by dam construction.8 2 A religious rights-based claim to water
would provide legally cognizable claims to protect the type of TEK
employed by the Altaians-TEK which successfully influenced water
policy and informed scientific knowledge.
Claims to water resources grounded in TEK with a demonstrated
economic or environmental value are more likely to succeed as those claims
are less likely to be challenged as unreasonable. Such claims can expand
existing knowledge on tools for sustainable development by legitimizing
the knowledge and practice of communities most familiar with the
historical function of ecosystems on traditional indigenous lands. 83
Nevertheless, in citing case studies like those of the Katun River, there
is a danger of adhering to the myth of the "ecologically noble savage. 84
Indigenous religious beliefs and practices may have detrimental ecological
effects. For example, the religious motivation behind the construction of
the iconic stone statues of Easter Island arguably contributed to the
ecological catastrophe that deforested and largely depopulated the island.85
Where claims for water resources are grounded on practices or beliefs with
no demonstrable economic or environmental benefit, these claims are less
likely to succeed as those claims will likely be challenged as unreasonable.
Those claims with no economic or environmental benefit undermine efforts
to legitimize TEK as an important source of best practices for sustainable
development.86
Further, resource management decisions based on indigenous religions
can be as much of a double-edged sword as any other approach to resource
management. For example, the Navajo Nation (Navajo) sued the U.S.
Forest Service for desecrating a sacred site by authorizing use of treated
sewage effluent to supplement snow during low precipitation years in a ski
resort on mountains owned by the federal government, leased to a ski resort
developer, and considered sacred by the Navajo. 87 Arguably, the Navajo's
82. Id. at 1300-02.
83. Id.
84. Kent H. Redford & Allyn Maclean Stearmn, Forest-Dwelling Native Amazonians and the
Conservation of Biodiversity: Interests in Common or in Collision?, 7 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 248,
254 (1993).
85. See JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED, Chap. 2
(Viking Books 2005).
86. Klubnikin et al, supra note 81, at 1300-02.
87. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008).
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opposition would prevent pollution from sewage effluent with elevated
nutrient and bacteria levels. 8 However, the opposition of the Navajo also
could create obstacles to water recycling, regarded by many as an essential
component to water resource conservation in arid regions.89
Thus, even where TEK may have demonstrable environmental
benefits, concerns over the cost-benefit analysis of implementing such TEK
on a cross-cultural scale are problematic, particularly as religiously-based
TEK may defy cost-benefit analysis in the minds of indigenous peoples
basing claims on such TEK.90 Despite the potential drawbacks, a strategy
of basing claims to water resources predicated on TEK preserves and
transmits potentially-valuable TEK in the face of a hegemonic threat to the
culture of indigenous peoples.91
B. Indigenous Religious Claims to Water and Interpretation of Law
In addition to preserving valuable TEK, indigenous religious rights-
based claims to water resources may legitimize interpretations of existing
water law in support of ecological preservation and sustainable water
management. 92 For example, the Doctrine of Beneficial Use governs water
appropriations in most of the Western United States.93 The Doctrine of
Beneficial Use provides that a water right is legally recognized only if the
water is put to a "beneficial use"--with non-use resulting in forfeiture of
the water right, and wasteful use prohibited.94 Often, state water law
establishes a narrow definition of "beneficial use" that does not recognize
cultural uses of water or even in-stream uses of water such as stream flow
preservation.
95
To preserve such water uses and water management options, the Wind
River Reservation, encompassing the Shoshone and Arapahoe people,
88. Id. at 1082.
89. Id at 1065.
90. See generally Klubnikin et al, supra note 81, at 1300-02; Redford and Stearmn,
supra note 84 at 252.
91. See generally Klubnikin et al, supra note 81, at 1300-02; Redford and Stearmn,
supra note 84 at 252.
92. Klubnikin et al, supra note 81, at 1300-02.
93. Cathleen Flanagan and Melinda Laituri, Local Cultural Knowledge and Water
Resource Management: The Wind River Indian Reservation, 33 ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
262, 270 (2004).
94. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Clark County, 254 P.3d 606, 611 (Nev. 2011); see also
Stephen F. Williams, The Requirement of Beneficial Use as a Cause of Waste in Water Resource
Development, 23 NAT. RESOURCE J. 7 (1983).
95, Flanagan and Laituri, supra note 93, at 266.
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developed the Wind River Water Code, which provides that religious and
in-stream uses of water fall within the definition of "beneficial use,"
thereby legally protecting water rights based on ceremonial and ecological
conservation as "beneficial uses."'96 Legal arguments tying the human right
to water with religious rights lend legitimacy to the Wind River approach
and would support in-stream and religious uses of water as valid under the
Doctrine of Beneficial Use.97 A right to water based on religious rights
could foreclose legal challenges that require users to withdraw and
sometimes waste water or face losing water rights under the common "use-
it-or-lose-it" principle.98
However, interpretation of water law arising from religious rights-
based claims to water carries several risks. First, the religious rights
argument to water resources could be made as a pretext to secure an
inequitable or unsustainable allocation of water or unreasonable protection
of water quality. 99  For example, indigenous communities in the
Southwestern United States have made both formal and informal efforts to
prevent uranium mining on tribal land, or land held sacred by tribes.100
These efforts have been challenged by both mining companies and tribal
members claiming that religiously-based bans preclude economic
development for tribal communities in need of jobs and industry from
development of tribal natural resources.' 10 Furthermore, development of
uranium could form part of the efforts to develop nuclear power to mitigate
climate change, which has arguably disproportionate impacts on indigenous
peoples.10 2 Nevertheless, these tribal communities opposing uranium mine
96. Id.
97. Id. at 264, 266.
98. See e.g., id. at 265; Geringer v. Runyan, 235 P.3d 867, 870 (2010); see also R.
Lambeth Townsend, Cancellation of Water Rights in Texas: Use It or Lose It, 17 ST. MARY'S L.
J. 1217 (1986).
99. Havasupai Tribe v. U.S., 752 F.Supp. 1471, 1476 (D. Ariz. 1990), affd, 943 F.2d 32
(9th Cir. 1991).
100. See, e.g., Havasupai Tribe, 752 F.Supp. at 1480; see also Winona LaDuke, "Navajos
Ban Uranium Mining," EARTH ISLAND JOURNAL, Autumn 2005, Vol. 20 Issue 3, 37-38.
101. Judy Pastemak, Mining Firms Again Eyeing Navajo Land, LA TIMES.COM, Nov. 22,
2006, http://www.latimes.com/news/la-na-navajo22nov,0,2730465.storypage=l (last visited Oct.
16, 2012); see also Navajo's Ban Uranium Mining on Reservation, ASSOCIATED PRESS, April 22,
2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7602821/ns/usnews-environment/t/navajos-ban-uranium-
mining-reservation/#.UHwxGIaxPCD (last visited Oct. 16, 2012).
102. Albert C. Lin, Evangelizing Climate Change, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1135, 1170-71
(2009); see also Christopher Furgal & Jacinthe Seguin, Climate Change, Health and Vulnerability
in Canadian Northern Aboriginal Communities, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1964, 1968 (2006);
Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony of State Water Law, 29 STAN. ENvTL. L.J.
1, 59 (2010).
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development have suffered severe health impacts from uranium mining in
the past.'0 3 The challenge of basing claims to protect or access water
resources on religious grounds is well-delineated when those claims are
reasonable, or if the benefits can be weighed against the costs.
Second, religious arguments can be asserted in a manner that could
uniquely (and perhaps unfairly or unwisely) privilege religious belief. For
example, in Employment Division v. Smith, the United States Supreme
Court addressed a claim by a small group of indigenous people who were
denied unemployment benefits by the state because they were fired from
their employment for testing positive for peyote, an illegal narcotic used by
indigenous people for ceremonial purposes.' 4
In holding against these claimants, the Court cited precedent that
government can burden religious practice because holding otherwise would
be "in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."' 5 A
similar concern arises in the context of religious claims to water, whereby
each individual could become "a law unto himself' if religious arguments
were interpreted broadly, and impinge on legitimate and necessary water
allocations or appropriately-established water quality standards. 1
06
Again, opponents of tribal efforts to ban uranium mining could claim
that tribal religious beliefs make tribes a "law unto themselves." This
imposes costs on others; in the case of the uranium mining ban, the costs
are the loss of economic opportunities and opportunities to mitigate
greenhouse gas emissions contributing to global climate change.
C. Indigenous Religious Claims to Water and Water Conflict
As a religious movement with desert roots, Islam is a rich source of
spiritually-derived water conservation ethics. Islamic law provides for
prioritization of water uses:
1) for human health;
2) for domestic animals; and
3) for irrigation. °7
103. NAVAJONATION CODE tit. 18, § 1301(A)-(F) (2005).
104. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
105. Id. at 879.
106. Id.
107. Naser I. Faruqui, Islam and Water Management: Overview and Principles, in
WATER MANAGEMENT IN ISLAM, 2-3 (Faruqui, Naser I., Asit K. Biswas, and Murad J. Bino eds.,
United Nations University Press: New York 2001); see also Shaukat Farooq & Zafar Ansari,
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Islamic law also includes protection of water resources for ecological
purposes.
108
Islamic law relating to water management has been a powerful
influence for peace in water disputes between indigenous peoples. For
example, Islamic law prioritizes water uses (as described above) between
Berber tribes in the Atlas Mountains and Bedouin tribes in the Negev
Desert.109 Islamic law not only guides water management as between these
communities but also guides dispute resolution mechanisms, including
ritual forgiveness ceremonies for breaches of water agreements. 10
Nevertheless, religious interests could make already complicated and
contentious water disputes virtually intractable. For example, water cannot
be bought or sold under a common interpretation of Islamic law, and the
use of water must be available to all equally. 11' This interpretation could be
a source of opposition both to the privatization of water resources or
existing water rights, which could aggravate conflict within the watershed.
Ultimately, a religious rights-based claim by indigenous people to
water resources protects and promotes TEK. Furthermore, religious-based
TEK itself is evidence of water use and water protection efforts to which
indigenous communities may point to establish legitimate claims to
sovereignty over their traditional water or at least an equitable
apportionment of shared water resources.
12
IV. FRAMEWORKS FOR ADJUDICATING INDIGENOUS RELIGIOUS CLAIMS TO
WATER
While religious rights-based claims by indigenous peoples to water
resources may promote and protect socially-valuable TEK, such claims may
have adverse impacts. These impacts include aggravating water conflict or
supporting overreaching claims to water resources by indigenous
communities shared with others who have legitimate claims. The question
remains how an international court facing such claims should balance
concerns for indigenous rights and socially-valuable TEK against such
Wastewater Reuse in Muslim Countries: An Islamic Perspective, 7 ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT 119, 123 (1983).
108. Faruqui, supra note 107, at 3; Farooq and Ansari, supra note 107, at 119-23.
109. Aaron T. Wolf, Indigenous Approaches to Water Conflict Negotiations and Implications
for International Waters, 5 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: A JOURNAL OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 2
(Dec. 2000).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See generally Wolf, supra note 109, at 365.
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potential countervailing adverse impacts associated with religious-based
claims to water rights.
Given the positive and negative implications associated with religious-
based arguments for indigenous rights to water discussed above, courts
must be extremely careful in evaluating such claims. Several possible
frameworks could be employed to evaluate these claims, but this section
will propose and evaluate two such frameworks: first, the "substantial
burden" framework; and second, a modified "customary law" framework.
Ultimately, the modified "customary law" framework proposed in this
paper provides a better approach for international courts, as it can be more
effectively considered evidence of valuable water uses such as religiously-
based TEK.
A. The "Substantial Burden" Framework
Federal courts in the United States rely on a four-part inquiry to
evaluate claims of government action burdening religious expression:
1) Does the claim involve a sincere religious belief?;
2) Does the government action impose a substantial burden on
the free exercise of religion?;
3) If there is a substantial burden, does the government have a
compelling interest justifying the substantial burden?; and
4) If there is both a substantial burden and a compelling
interest, then has the government applied the means least
restrictive of religion in achieving its compelling
interest?113
The Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith abandoned this test;
however, the U.S. Congress responded to that decision by enacting the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, restoring the "substantial burden" test,
which has been upheld and applied to federal law.
114
1. The Advantages of the "Substantial Burden" Framework
Given the inherent complexity and subjectivity of religious rights
claims, the "substantial burden" framework is a straightforward and
reasonable approach to evaluating claims of unlawful governmental
intrusion into religious expression. International tribunals could apply this
113. Smith, 494 U.S. at 895 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
114. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-84; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997);
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
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same four-part test to indigenous religious claims to water resources under
the CP Covenant.
Religious rights-based claims to water would be stronger in the context
of international law than in the context of U.S. law for three reasons. First,
the CP Covenant is worded more broadly than the U.S. Constitution's First
Amendment (First Amendment). Whereas the First Amendment limits
governmental authority to laws "prohibiting" the free exercise of religion,
Article 18 of the CP Covenant provides that "[e]veryone shall have the right
to freedom of... religion. This right shall include freedom to ... manifest
his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching."' 15 It
was the narrow wording of the First Amendment that led to the holding in
Smith, a problem more easily avoided under the CP Covenant, making the
"substantial burden" test a natural fit.
Second, unlike the First Amendment, the CP Covenant expressly
provides that religious rights may be limited only as "prescribed by law and
[as] necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others."' 16 The CP Covenant thus
provides for a balancing of secular interests against religious freedoms and
the "substantial burden" framework is a well-developed method for the
courts' balancing of those interests.
Third, the IP Declaration, which would guide the interpretation of the
CP Covenant, draws an express legal connection between the guarantee of
religious rights and indigenous peoples' traditional use of water. This is
referred to in Article 25 of the IP Declaration as a "distinctive spiritual
relationship" with traditional water uses. 1 7 Thus, unlike U.S. religious
rights jurisprudence, international law contemplates a nexus between
religious rights and indigenous water uses, facilitating translation of the
"substantial burden" test to questions of water rights.
2. Potential Disadvantages of the "Substantial Burden" Framework
The "substantial burden" framework raises potential challenges. The
test requires a court to determine if a burden is "substantial. 1 18 Drawing
lines between "substantial" and "insubstantial" burdens in religion is
especially difficult in cases of minority religions like those of many
indigenous communities. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor noted in Smith, guarantees of religious freedom are most
115. CP Covenant, supra note 17, at art. 18(1).
116. Id. art. 18(3).
117. IP Declaration, supra note 5, at art. 25.
118. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-04.
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precious to minority religions, as those religions face a greater risk of being
affected by laws of general applicability than members of mainstream
religions whose interests are more easily asserted through political
processes.'' 9
Courts may view faith through the lens of mainstream religions, and
thus fail to grasp the importance given by many indigenous faiths to water.
Such was arguably the case in the Navajo Nation case, where the court
upheld the government's approval of discharges of treated sewage effluent
onto sacred Navajo land, the court held that the discharge was not a
"substantial burden" to the Navajo religious observers.120  The court in
Navajo Nation arguably failed to grasp the magnitude of the tribe's burden,
arguing that there cannot be a substantial burden unless the state either
denies benefits or criminalizes behavior based on religious beliefs.
121
Indeed, the dissent in Navajo Nation notes: "I do not think that the majority
would accept that the burden on a Christian's exercise of religion would be
'insubstantial' if the government permitted only treated sewage effluent for
use as baptismal water.'
' 22
Finally, the "substantial burden" framework, which inadequately
addresses issues arising under indigenous religious law under First
Amendment jurisprudence, may not effectively translate into international
law.
B. A Modified "Customary Law" Framework
Despite its advantages, the "substantial burden" framework arguably
provides too little protection for the rights of indigenous peoples and is too
integrated with First Amendment jurisprudence to be effectively applied in
the international law context. Another potential framework for courts to
consider would be to examine religious claims by indigenous peoples to
water resources as a "customary law" interest in water, giving rise to a
quasi-property right. 23  In this way, indigenous communities avail
themselves of the benefits of grounding their claims to water resources on
negative rights protected under the CP Covenant and also retain the benefits
of preserving and legitimizing religiously-based and beneficial TEK.
119. Smith, 494 U.S. at 902.
120. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d. at 1090.
121. Id. at 1097.
122. Id.
123. Yvette Trahan, The Richtersveld Community and Others v. Alexkor Ltd.: Declaration
of a 'Right in Land' Through a 'Customary Law Interest' Sets Stage for Introduction of
Aboriginal Title into South African Legal System, 12 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 565, 567-68
(2004).
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However, they avoid the complications associated with claims based solely
on religious freedom rights. 1
24
An example of this approach can be found in South African law. The
indigenous people of the Richtersveld region of South Africa possessed
their land for centuries, long before European colonization, until their land
was largely turned over to international corporations for diamond mining. 25
The Richtersveld community's claims to a right to their traditional land was
upheld on appeal to the South African Supreme Court, based on the
community's argument that it had a right to the land under its own
indigenous law, amounting to a "customary law interest" leading to a right
to the land.
126
"Customary law" forms a part of the law of many countries, as it is
inherited from Roman and British law. 127 To constitute valid law, "custom"
must have four elements:
1) ancient;
2) reasonable;
3). certain; and
4) uniformly observable. 128
Canada has relied on "customary law" to support aboriginal claims to
title and rights to land use. 129 Canadian law views indigenous claims to
land under "customary law" as a spectrum of interests, ranging from no real
interest in the land on one end to the middle of the spectrum, where custom
may not support title to the land but can support a "site-specific right" to
engage in ceremonial or cultural activities. At the far end of the spectrum,
"customary law" would support the indigenous community's claim to title
to the land itself.1
30
This same common law concept could be applied to indigenous claims
to water resources based on religious custom, but modified to incorporate
rights based on beneficial TEK. Where indigenous religious practice
related to water is ancient, uninterrupted, certain, and reasonable as
124. CP Covenant, supra note 17, at art. 1(2) and art. 17(1) (guaranteeing protection from
arbitrary interference with means of subsistence and home, and guarantees peoples rights to
dispose of their own resources).
125. Trahan, supra note 123, at 566.
126. Id. at 567.
127. Id. at 568.
128. Id. at 569.
129. Id. at 571.
130. Trahan, supra note 123, at 571-72.
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evidenced by TEK, such indigenous communities could assert a right to
water based on "customary law" in international courts.
1. Advantages of a Modified "Customary Law" Framework
The "customary law" framework has many benefits. It is a widely-
accepted and adjudicated principle in many parts of the world, and thus
well-suited for application on an international level.' Indeed, the Inter-
American Court for Human Rights has already relied on "customary law"
principles in holding that the American Convention on Human Rights
includes the right of indigenous peoples to the protection of their traditional
natural resources. 1
32
Furthermore, the "customary law" framework includes considerations
of "reasonableness," which would allow courts necessary discretion to
avoid unsustainable or inequitable religious claims to water by indigenous
communities. 133 Additionally, by allowing for a spectrum of interests in
property, the approach is sufficiently nuanced to allow multiple water uses
and property rights within the same watershed. Indeed, by taking a
"property rights" approach based on religious uses rather than a "religious
rights" approach, indigenous communities retain the benefits of a claim
grounded in the binding CP Covenant, enabling a mechanism for claims by
non-state actors predicated on immediately binding and mature rights.
The CP Covenant guarantees rights of people to self-determination; to
freely dispose of their natural resources, to be free of arbitrary deprivation
of means of subsistence, and to be free from arbitrary invasions of the
home.134 A "customary law" property right to water is arguably protected
under these provisions to the same degree as religious rights under the CP
Covenant. 135  As such, under a "customary law" approach, indigenous
communities retain the legal strategic benefits of grounding water resource
claims on rights guaranteed under the CP Covenant, but avoid the types of
subjective and potentially culturally-biased balancing tests (like the
"substantial burden" test) employed by courts in religious rights cases.
131. Id. at 569.
132. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79
(Aug. 31, 2001) (The Inter-American Court for Human Rights found that Nicaragua had violated the
rights of the Awas Tingni people by granting a timber concession to a logging company within the
tribe's traditional area without the tribe's consent.); see also Claudio Grossman & S. James Anaya, The
Case of the Awas Tingi v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the International Law of Indigenous Peoples, 19
AZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2002).
133. Trahan, supra note 123, at 582.
134. CP Covenant, supra note 17, at art. I and art. 17.
135. See generally id.; Trahan, supra note 123, at 569.
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Additionally, this approach furthers interests in the simultaneous
protection of the environment and indigenous culture embodied in TEK,
while avoiding the challenge courts face in evaluating religious beliefs and
the degree to which government action burdens those beliefs.
2. Potential Disadvantages of the "Modified Customary" Law Framework
This "customary law" framework raises several problems. First, the
elements of "customary law" can be very difficult to establish: where
colonial rule has interrupted certain customary practices, where certainty is
lacking as to the customary nature of the practice, and where a practice is a
relatively recent development. 136 However, a modified approach, where
beneficial TEK is considered an essential element in demonstrating rights to
water resources, may avoid this problem by grounding claims in
demonstrable, culturally-transmitted, and beneficial uses.
Second, and perhaps most problematic, this framework conceptualizes
indigenous customs within the context of Western ideas of rights and
ownership-concepts which may be incompatible. Indigenous
communities may attempt to frame their customs within the context of
Western rights in an attempt to secure resources or preserve culture, but in
doing so, could further exacerbate hegemonic convergence.
V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the framework used, a "liberty rights" approach to water
resource claims (such as a religious rights-based claim) has several
advantages. First, the international human right to water lacks consensus in
part because it has been framed as a "welfare right," raising concerns about
state liability for water service and impacts on private property rights. A
"liberty rights" approach does not raise those same concerns while being
legally binding, unlike "welfare rights." Second, "liberty rights" claims to
water legitimize and protect effective TEK, as well as ecological and
cultural uses of water.
Most importantly, "liberty rights" claims appropriately introduce
questions of religious culture into the debate on water rights. As population
grows and climate changes, allocation and protection of water resources
will become increasingly contentious. The most hotly contested
watersheds, including the Jordan River, Ganges River, Indus River, and
Colorado River, have several things in common. In particular, each of
these international river basins has religious significance and the river
basins support indigenous communities. To avoid or mitigate water
136. Trahan, supra note 123, at 584-85.
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conflict, policy-makers and judges must look beyond politics, economics,
and ecology, and incorporate considerations of religion and culture in the
formulation and interpretation of water law.
